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Abstract 
In previous studies, we have proposed financial instruments supporting REDD (FI-
REDD). Within a microeconomic framework we modeled interactions between an 
electricity producer (EP), electricity consumer (EC), and forest owner (FO). FI-REDD 
allows for optional consumption of emission offsets by the EP (any amount up to the 
initially contracted volume is allowed), and includes a benefit-sharing mechanism 
between the EP and FO as it regards unused offsets. The modeling results indicated that 
FI-REDD might help avoid bankruptcy of CO2-intensive producers at high levels of CO2 
prices. We demonstrated the impact of benefit-sharing and risk preferences on the 
contracted REDD offsets quantity. 
Here, we further develop the FI-REDD model by introducing two modifications. Firstly, 
we add opportunity cost of the forest owner, i.e. forest value alternative to REDD. This 
change leads to a realistic risk-adjusted supply curves for REDD, which are generated by 
the indifference (fair) pricing model and calculated for all possible benefit-sharing ratios. 
Secondly, we introduce an uncertainty associated with acceptance (fungibility) of REDD 
offsets in the second stage of the model. Modeling results demonstrate in a quantitative 
way the impact of fungibility uncertainty and positive effects of the benefit-sharing 
mechanism. An optimal value of the benefit-sharing ratio can be found that guarantees 
contracting the highest amounts of offsets at the low equilibrium price. This qualitative 
feature of the benefit-sharing mechanism is robust with respect to the uncertainty 
parameters in the model. We also undertake an in-depth analysis of decision making of 
the electricity producer using 3D visualization tools.  
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Oppotrunity costs and offsets acceptance in FI-REDD model 
Andrey Krasovskii 
Nikolay Khabarov 
1 Introduction 
The 2015 Paris climate agreement encourages countries to “take action to implement and 
support activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+)” (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). REDD 
has been suggested as a climate change mitigation strategy that is based on the philosophy 
to reward countries for reducing their deforestation and forest degradation by financial 
benefits via the generation of carbon credits (Plugge et al., 2013). REDD is a relatively 
low-cost mitigation option (Busch et al., 2009; Lubowski and Rose, 2013), and its 
integration in the global mitigation strategy has a potential to allow for larger emissions 
reductions and a lower overall abatement cost (Koch et al., 2017). This integration can be 
done by linking REDD as an emission reduction credit program to major cap-and-trade 
programs (Angelsen and Rudel, 2013). However, there is still an ongoing discussion 
related to uncertainties and risks in REDD implementation (Golub et al., 2017). It is 
difficult to anticipate the combined effects on carbon and other co-benefits owing to the 
disparity between the activities available under the REDD program (Corbera and 
Schroeder, 2011; Law et al., 2012). Accepting this uncertainty, we explore the relation 
between REDD supplier and GHG-emitting energy producer in the context of a 
potentially emerging REDD offsets market. 
 
In this study we further develop the FI-REDD model proposed in a series of publications 
(Krasovskii et al., 2016a, 2016b, 2014). Here we explore the impacts of the benefit-
sharing mechanism on the contracted amounts of REDD offsets under uncertainty coming 
from the future carbon (CO2) price and possibly incomplete offsets acceptance. FI-REDD  
is a partial equilibrium model of interacting forest owners, electricity producers and 
consumers (Krasovskii et al., 2014). The model takes into account potential market power 
of the energy producers, which gives them flexibility in their decision-making under 
uncertain emission costs. We proposed an idea of fair price of the REDD offsets, which 
is based on the indifference principle in the two-stage problem setting. In the first stage 
(period), where details about the future REDD offsets market are uncertain, the parties 
(supplier and consumer of REDD offsets) assign their offsets (buying and selling) prices 
in the way, that their profits, or in general – utilities, in the second period (where the 
REDD offsets price reveals) stay the same, not matter if they contract REDD offsets in 
the first period, or not. 
Methodologically, a two-period optimization problem under uncertainty formed the basis 
for modeling. The idea of benefit-sharing consists in possible sharing of offsets in the 
second period. The general idea of benefit-sharing is important within the REDD context  
 2 
(Dunlop and Corbera, 2016). The benefit-sharing concept is also relevant in the 
international law context (Morgera, 2016). Here we consider specifically a situation 
where benefits are shared between the REDD supplier and consumer. It was shown that 
in the case of risk-neutral utilities, the benefit-sharing does not provide advantages if the 
supplier and consumer of REDD offsets have symmetric information about future price 
distribution, while it has positive impacts on increasing the contracted amount and 
lowering equilibrium prices under asymmetric information (Krasovskii et al., 2016a). The 
FI-REDD model expanded by introducing exponential utility functions (Krasovskii et al., 
2016b) showed that the risk-averse behavior has positive effect on contracted amounts.  
In this study, we demonstrate a gap between risk-adjusted supply and demand curves that 
could lead to non-uniqueness of the equilibrium price. To avoid this situation, we expand 
the FI-REDD model by introducing opportunity costs of the forest owner. Opportunity 
costs include the forgone economic benefits of the alternative land/forest use. They can 
include social-cultural cost because preventing the conversion of forests to other land uses 
can significantly affect the livelihoods of many rural dwellers. Opportunity cost can also 
include indirect cost, because changes in economic activities, from timber and agriculture 
to other productive sectors, can affect downstream actors of associated product supply 
chains (White and Minang, 2010). As it is reasonable to assume that this opportunity cost 
sets a minimum amount that would have to be paid to keep the land in forest, regardless 
of the way it is done or the source of the funding for doing it, opportunity cost is the basic 
starting point for economic analyses of REDD (Boucher, 2008). In this paper, we 
introduce opportunity cost in the model. This modification leads to a realistic risk-
adjusted supply curve, having a convex shape or U-shape, depending on the benefit-
sharing ratio.  
 
We also add an additional uncertainty source in the FI-REDD model by introducing the 
offsets acceptance (fungibility) uncertainty (Dooley and Gupta, 2017) in the second 
period. The fungibility assumption is that avoided emissions and removals from the land 
sector were interchangeable with emission reductions from fossil fuels. Carbon credits 
from REDD could be made fully interchangeable with those from other sectors, or limited 
in their fungibility (Bosetti et al., 2011; Neeff and Ascui, 2009). The approach proposed 
in the paper is related to the idea of partial offsetting (discounted REDD credits) (Beltran 
et al., 2013). For example, a developed country may be required to buy 2 REDD credits 
(tCO2) in the market to offset 1 credit of domestic emissions (Angelsen et al., 2014).  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section, we sketch the structure of the 
FI-REDD model and present an in-depth results dealing with benefit-sharing mechanism. 
We indicated the possible issue of non-uniqueness of the equilibrium price of the REDD 
offsets at some benefit-sharing ratios. The second section is devoted to introduction of 
opportunity cost of the forest owner; we show how this modification affects the role of 
benefit-sharing mechanism. In the third section, we model uncertainty associated with 
acceptance (fungibility) of REDD-based offsets. 
In this study we consider risk-averse electricity producer and forest owner (Krasovskii et 
al., 2016b). From the perspective of policy implications, we assume that there is a policy 
signal, which stimulated risk-averse behavior in the face of future uncertainty. The 
exogenously given benefit-sharing ratio can be also interpreted as a policy variable, which 
help to stimulate REDD market development. 
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2 FI-REDD Model 
In this section, we describe the methodology behind FI-REDD. For a range of CO2 prices 
and respective risks perceived by the forest owner (seller) and electricity producer 
(buyer), we apply a model of fair (indifference) pricing. Parties’ risk preferences are 
reflected by exponential utility functions. The potentially contracted amounts of REDD 
offsets are analyzed under various risk preferences and for different benefit-sharing 
opportunities (Krasovskii et al., 2016b, 2016a, 2014).  We consider the case when the 
energy producer has market power (Janssen and Wobben, 2009; Krasovskii et al., 2016a) 
– the ability to reduce the production output and charge higher electricity prices to 
consumers.  
There are two periods in the FI-REDD model: in the first period (“today”) the CO2 price 
is low, and in the second period it is uncertain, i.e. given by a probability distribution. An 
interesting feature of the model is that electricity producer and forest owner have different 
perceptions of uncertainty. For the electricity producer the high CO2 price realization is 
associated with high risk, as they lose more profit. On the opposite, for the forest owner 
the higher the price is the better, as in this case they could profit more from selling the 
offsets in the second period, compared to the first period (low price). Here we assume for 
simplicity that CO2 price and market price of offsets coincide.  
The benefit-sharing mechanism is included in the decision-making of the electricity 
producer; they can share a part of initially contracted (but not used for offsetting) amount 
of REDD offsets with the forest owner in the second period. The basis for sharing is an 
exogenously given benefit-sharing ratio. Due to the transparency in the decision-making 
process, the forest owner estimates the price of the offsets in the first period, depending 
on the sharing ratio and the known response function of the electricity producer at 
different carbon price realizations in the second period. 
2.1 Basic model constructions 
For the sake of clarity, we partially reproduce the model; a full description is available in 
previous papers (Krasovskii et al., 2016a, 2016b). Let us consider the profit of the 
electricity producer Π𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅  at a CO2 price realization 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2 in the second period: 
Π𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑅𝑅 (𝑥𝑥�,𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2) = Πe(𝑥𝑥�) − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2[−ℇ + 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥�)]+ + 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2[−𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥�) + ℇ]+ + 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸ℇ.      (1) 
Here [𝑦𝑦]+ = max(𝑦𝑦, 0), ℇ is the amount of offsets contracted (being evaluated) in the 
first period, 𝑥𝑥� = 𝑥𝑥�(𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2) is the optimal technological mix that maximizes the profit at 
price realization 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2, 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥�) is optimal amount of emission in the second period,  Πe(𝑥𝑥�) 
– optimal profit from electricity production without offsetting costs, 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 is the (buying) 
price that electricity producer pays for the offsets in the first period, 𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0,1] is the 
benefit-sharing ratio. 
We denote by symbol 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅(𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2) = [ℇ − 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥�)]+ offsets shared with the forest owner in 
the second period. Then the profit of the forest owner in the second period is calculated 
as follows: 
Π𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂
R (𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2) = (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅(𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2)+𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹ℇ,                                 (2) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 is the (selling) price of the offsets in the first period.  
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Figure 1. Decision-making of the electricity producer. Uncertainty in the second period is represented by a CO2 
price distribution. 
Prices  𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 and 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 are determined based on the indifference (fairness) principle for the 
given distribution of CO2 prices, as proposed in (Krasovskii et al., 2016a). 
The optimal (profit-maximizing) behavior of the electricity producer in the second period 
when CO2 price is realized is shown in Figure 1. As the process of sharing is the basis for 
modeling, below we present detailed results for two price realizations. For the illustration 
purposes, the same setup and input data as in (Krasovskii et al., 2016b) is considered. 
Figure 2 illustrates the key features of the model. With small value of the benefit-sharing 
ratio (big share for the forest owner), the electricity producer uses all the offsets without 
sharing with the forest owner. As the benefit-sharing ratio grows, the electricity producer 
starts to share the offsets; particularly, if contracted amount ℇ is large. The shape of the 
graph is nonlinear, due to the model structure, including non-linear demand for electricity 
(see [2]). The “top of the hill” corresponds to the largest contracted amount and highest 
value of the benefit-sharing ratio (smallest share for the forest owner). At higher prices, 
the sharing starts at lower ratios (compare figures for CO2 prices 40 US$/ton of CO2 and 
70 US$/ton of CO2). These two examples show how the mechanism works in the second 
period. 
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Figure 2. Impacts of benefit-sharing ratio, on the amount of offsets shared in the second period, at different CO2 price 
realizations. Notations: 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = ℇ – amount of offsets contracted in the first period, 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 – optimal amount of offsets shared 
with the forest owner in the second period, 𝛿𝛿 – benefit-sharing ratio. 
2.2 Determining fair (indifference) prices 
The fair prices of the forest owner, 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹, and electricity producer, 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸,  are determined by 
the indifference principle; in a way that their utilities stay the same no matter if they are 
contacting REDD offsets in the first period, or not. The utilities are calculated based on 
the profits with and without REDD. For instance, the profit of the electricity producer 
without REDD is simply Πe(𝑥𝑥�(𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2))− 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥�(𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2)), while the profit of the forest 
owner is Π𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂�𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2� = 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2 × ℇ. Afterwards expected utilities (functions of profits) 
depending on the risk-preferences are calculated (see (Krasovskii et al., 2016b)).  
The indifference prices can be determined for a given amount of REDD offsets, ℇ, given 
distribution of CO2 prices and benefit-sharing ratio. Here we apply exponential utility 
functions – the same as in (Krasovskii et al., 2016b) – which allow for analytical 
derivation of fair prices. Further, we use the same input data, and consider risk-averse 
forest owner and electricity producer by taking the following parameters of exponential 
utilities: α = β = 0.1 (see (Krasovskii et al., 2016b)). In the model, functions 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹(ℇ, 𝛿𝛿) 
and 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸(ℇ, 𝛿𝛿) represent risk-adjusted supply and demand curves for REDD offsets; they 
are used for determination of equilibrium price/quantity. 
2.3 The role of benefit-sharing ratio 
FI-REDD aims to find the equilibrium quantities of REDD offsets for different benefit-
sharing ratios. 
In Figure 3 the supply (solid line) and demand (dashed line) for REDD offsets are 
depicted for several values of benefit-sharing ratio, 𝛿𝛿, in the model without opportunity 
costs (more generally: constant costs) for the forest owner. An amount of offsets can be 
contracted, when supply curve lays below the demand curve for this amount. The 
equilibrium price and quantity are found at the intersection, when this intersection exists. 
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The figure shows that intersection exists for 𝛿𝛿 = 0.5 and 𝛿𝛿 = 0.55. A gap between supply 
and demand curves appears for all 𝛿𝛿 ≥ 0.6. The resulting equilibrium quantities for 𝛿𝛿 
from 0 to 1 with a step 0.5 are depicted in Figure 4 where the indicated equilibrium price 
for 𝛿𝛿 ≥ 0.6 is 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 that is the minimum of 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 and 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸. 
 
Figure 3. Fair prices of the forest owner (FO), and electricity producer (EP) for different amounts of REDD offsets at 
several values of benefit-sharing ratio. They represent risk-adjusted supply and demand curves, respectively. Risk-
averse electricity producer and forest owner are considered, i.e. exponential parameters: 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 = 0.1. 
This results in the highest contacted amount, as indicated in Figure 4. At the values 𝛿𝛿 ≥0.6, the equilibrium price is not determined uniquely. In the figure we show the price of 
the REDD supplier (forest owner), but it could be the higher price of consumer (electricity 
producer), or any price between those two. An example, illustrating the gap for 𝛿𝛿 = 1, is 
shown on the left of the figure. This situation creates room for speculation. In the next 
section, we introduce a modification, which helps to overcome this issue. 
 
Figure 4. Impacts of benefit-sharing ratio on equilibrium price/quantity of REDD offsets in the model without 
opportunity costs (left panel). The indicated equilibrium price for δ≥0.6 is 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 (here 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 < 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 for δ≥0.6). Demand (EP) 
and supply (FO) curves for 𝛿𝛿 = 1 (right panel). 
3 Opportunity costs of forest owner 
The decreasing shape of the supply curve appears in FI-REDD due to the fact that forest 
owner considers the forest allocated entirely to REDD offsets. In reality, there are more 
values associated with the forest. They can be represented by the opportunity cost curve. 
Here we take an increasing shape of the opportunity cost. The interpretation is that the 
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smaller offsets amount require smaller portion of forest, which has less alternative values, 
while the larger forest areas have higher opportunity costs. The shape of the exogenously 
given exponential cost curve is depicted in Figure 5 together with the corresponding 
update in the supply curve. The case of 𝛿𝛿 = 0 corresponds to the situation when nothing 
is shared with the forest owner, so his supply curve exclusively for REDD is slightly 
decreasing (due to risk-aversion), and the opportunity costs define its increasing shape. 
 
Figure 5. Opportunity cost curve (left) and supply curve with and without opportunity costs (OC) for 𝛿𝛿 = 0  (right). 
The updated supply curves are shown in Figure 6 for several values of benefit-sharing 
ratio. Implementation of opportunity costs led to the case when the intersection exists for 
all values 𝛿𝛿. At small values of benefit-sharing ratio, e.g. 𝛿𝛿 = 0.15, the supply curve has 
and increasing shape. When the ratio increases, the supply curve decreases for smaller 
REDD offsets amounts, however, it increases for larger amounts due to high opportunity 
cost compared to benefits from REDD. This leads to the U-shaped supply curves, e.g. for 
𝛿𝛿 = 0.6 and 𝛿𝛿 = 0.9. 
 
Figure 6. Supply and demand for REDD offsets with opportunity cost incurring to forest owner. 
 
The resulting equilibrium quantities/prices with respect to benefit-sharing ratio are shown 
in Figure 7, where the demand and supply curves for the case of 𝛿𝛿 = 1 (no sharing of 
benefits) are also presented. Compared to Figure 4 (right panel), one can see that the 
supply curve corresponding to 𝛿𝛿 = 1 has an increasing shape, leading to unique 
intersection with the demand curve (EP). An interesting observation is that benefit-
sharing ratio maintains its price-lowering and volume-boosting property (see Figure 4 left 
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panel). Namely, one can choose a value at around 0.75, which leads to a high contracted 
amount and a low price at the same time. 
 
Figure 7. Impacts of benefit-sharing ratio in FI-REDD model with opportunity costs (left panel). Demand (EP) and 
supply (FO) curves for 𝛿𝛿 = 1 (right panel). 
4 Modeling acceptance uncertainty 
The REDD acceptance i.e. future fungibility of emission offsets and those REDD-based 
is still under discussion. The fungibility assumption, i.e. that avoided emissions and 
removals from the land sector were interchangeable with emission reductions from fossil 
fuels, is debated in political and scientific circles (Dooley and Gupta, 2017). Carbon 
credits from REDD could be made fully interchangeable with those from other sectors, 
or limited in their fungibility (Angelsen et al., 2014; Bosetti et al., 2011; Neeff and Ascui, 
2009). 
Here we introduce the modification into the FI-REDD model that allows us to estimate 
the influence of this uncertainty on the behavior of REDD supplier and consumer. Along 
with the realization of the CO2 price, there is also unveiling of REDD acceptance in the 
second stage. For simplicity, we model two alternatives: first, full fungibility of REDD-
based offsets, and, second, only the part of the REDD offsets will be accepted, i.e. 1 ton 
of offsets covers only 0.25 ton of emissions.  
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Figure 8. Model with acceptance uncertainty, represented by a discrete probability distribution in the second period. 
The case of full acceptance corresponds to the situation when at every CO2 price 
realization REDD offsets are fully accepted with probability 1. This is the case of fungible 
REDD offsets. However, the scenario of partial offsetting (discounted REDD credits) is 
also possible (Angelsen et al., 2014; Beltran et al., 2013).  The idea of acceptance 
uncertainty as implemented in our study is illustrated in Figure 8. Let us denote the 
initially contracted amount of offsets by symbol ℇ1, in the second period this amount can 
be fully or partially accepted. For example, the fraction 𝛼𝛼1 is accepted with probability 
𝑤𝑤1, and a fraction 𝛼𝛼2  is accepted with probability 𝑤𝑤2. At each realization the 
corresponding amount available for offsetting emission is calculated as ℇ = ℇ1𝛼𝛼1 and 
ℇ = ℇ1𝛼𝛼2, respectively. Then the tree continues to the decision branches equivalent to the 
one in Figure 1 – decision on actual emissions and consequent sharing of benefits from 
selling on the market a part of initially contracted yet unused offsets.  
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Figure 9. FI-REDD with partial acceptance. At every CO2 price realization REDD offsets are fully accepted, i.e. 
𝛼𝛼1 = 1, with probability 𝑤𝑤1 = 0.5, and a quarter, 𝛼𝛼1 = 0.25, of offsets are accepted with probability 𝑤𝑤2 = 0.5. 
Here we present results for the following values of parameters; every CO2 price 
realization REDD offsets are fully accepted, i.e. 𝛼𝛼1 = 1, with probability 𝑤𝑤1 = 0.5, and 
a quarter, 𝛼𝛼1 = 0.25, of offsets are accepted with probability 𝑤𝑤2 = 0.5. The price 
distribution is discrete and consists of values {0, 10, 20, … , 80} with equal probability 
𝑝𝑝 =  1/9. The resulting contracted amount with respect to benefit-sharing ratio are 
depicted in Figure 9. The figure shows that the shapes of both quantity and price curves 
remains similar to the case of full acceptance (see Figure 7). However, due to the possible 
partial acceptance the contracted amounts and prices are lower (by approximately 25% 
and 35% respectively). The role of the benefit-sharing ratio stays the same, i.e. the value 
of 0.75 still leads to the best outcome in terms of the high amount of contracted offsets 
and low price. This indicates that the proposed benefit-sharing mechanism is robust with 
respect to acceptance uncertainty and efficient for reduction of the initial amount of funds 
required to contract large quantities of REDD offsets.  
5 Conclusions 
We have improved the FI-REDD model by introducing opportunity costs of the forest 
owner, as well as reflecting the REDD acceptance uncertainty in the model. The first 
modification is significant in determining the fair price of the forest owner; it leads to the 
realistic risk-adjusted supply curve for REDD offsets, which guarantees the existence of 
a unique equilibrium price for all benefit-sharing ratios. We have demonstrated that the 
property of the benefit-sharing mechanism to increase the contracted amount of offsets 
and decrease their price is valid in this case. The second modification consists in modeling 
acceptance of REDD offsets. We proposed an approach for modeling acceptance 
uncertainty, when REDD offsets may become not fully fungible in the future. The results 
show that the benefit-sharing mechanism is robust with respect to this uncertainty. 
Namely, there is an optimal benefit-sharing ratio, which guarantees a large contracted 
offsets amount at a low price. This result has two important implications for REDD 
financing. Firstly, the benefit-sharing is an instrument which provides flexibility to the 
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contracting parties, as they can use it to adapt contractual prices and quantities to 
uncertain realizations in the second period. Secondly, the benefit-sharing ratio could be a 
control variable, settled by governments or other bodies in order to expand the flows of 
REDD offsets and keep the transparent fair profit distribution. Further work can be 
devoted to a more qualitative modeling of REDD options including benefit-sharing. 
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